A connectionist approach to airliner safety by Schneider, Marvin Oliver & Rosa, João Luis Garcia
  Universidade de São Paulo
 
2014-07
 
A connectionist approach to airliner safety
 
 
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2014, Beijing.
http://www.producao.usp.br/handle/BDPI/46564
 
Downloaded from: Biblioteca Digital da Produção Intelectual - BDPI, Universidade de São Paulo
Biblioteca Digital da Produção Intelectual - BDPI
Departamento de Ciências de Computação - ICMC/SCC Comunicações em Eventos - ICMC/SCC
   
Abstract— The present paper introduces the system SINCO-
Flightsim, an intelligent hybrid symbolic connectionist approach 
for the treatment of emergency situations on commercial 
airliners, currently available as a computer simulation. The 
system’s main focus is on human failure, which accounts for a 
major part of accidents and incidents in airline traffic. The 
underlying architecture, using the biologically more plausible 
learning algorithm GeneRec and contrasting it to learning via 
back-propagation is presented. System modules are described as 
well as the learned data sets. In its first version, the system 
provides a series of typical sensors and means of interaction for 
treating emergency situations successfully. The respective results 
are outlined in this paper. We trust that the approach has the 
potential to contribute to airliner safety as it takes major stress 
factors off the pilots’ shoulders and helps treating emergency 
situations in a more objective manner. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N DECEMBER 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965, 
from Miami to Cali in Colombia had 155 passengers and 
8 crew members on board. On the approach to Cali after an 
uneventful flight, suddenly the navigation system of the 
Boeing 757 presented a failure causing it to “forget” a way 
point, which had to be reprogrammed. The reprogramming 
was done in a hurry and it did not become clear that actually a 
wrong course was provided, moving the plane in the direction 
of Bogotá, whereas it should have gone via Rozo. The mistake 
was discovered, but as the pilots tried to solve the condition, 
they were not aware they had put the plane on a crash course, 
at 3000 meters, with a mountain of that height. Shortly before 
the impact, the Ground Proximity Warning System sounded. 
Meanwhile, pilot reaction was immediate (moving up the nose 
of the plane) but not adequate (as the speed brakes did not 
allow going up sufficiently). The plane crashed into the top of 
the mountain. Only 4 passengers survived. More details may 
be found in Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association [1]. 
On September 29, 2006, a Boeing 737-800 of the Brazilian 
company GOL was on its way from Manaus (Northern Brazil) 
to Brasilia (Central Brazil) with 154 passengers on board. It 
disappeared from radars 4.48pm that day. The plane had 
crashed with the tip of its wings with an Embraer Legacy jet, 
which was about to be delivered to a customer. The Legacy, 
which was at a wrong altitude, could execute an emergency 
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landing and there were no injuries whereas the pilot of the 
GOL jet lost control. The plane flew in circles to the ground, 
causing gravitational forces much stronger than the planes 
project, which caused it to rip open yet airborne. On 
September 30, it was found destroyed in dense Amazon forest, 
inside a radius of 20 kilometers, at the Serra do Cachimbo. 
Nobody survived. For more information, refer to [20]. 
These and many other crashes have appeared instantly in 
the international press and shocked the world. And despite all 
efforts of the industry, every new year brings about new 
accidents, with one large focus on human error. 
The present approach was developed to treat situations similar 
to these, preventing losses of human lives and of high amounts 
of investment. It is currently available as a simulation. With 
support of the industry, future versions could be implemented 
on real airliners.   
II. MOTIVATION 
As said above, accidents are continuously happening. 
Analyzing accident databases the following main 
characteristics may be found [4][8][15]: 
• System malfunction; 
• Need for rapid (to very rapid) pilot response; 
• Surprise/shock; 
• High physical and emotional stress on the pilot; 
• Result: Pilot is prone to take the wrong decision. 
Clearly, there are accidents which cannot be avoided after 
an initial fatal setting. When KLM flight 4805 hit Pan Am 
flight 1736 on March, 27, 1977 in Tenerife [3], there was no 
way anymore to save the situation. In this case, anticipation is 
the only thing that could be done. 
In many other cases, however, the emergency situation can 
be treated. And this treatment is the main focus of the 
approach we propose. 
In the mentioned situations, an automated approach may 
react better and much more accurately than a human pilot, 
which is due to the fact that it is not subject to: Emotional 
stress, physical stress (the way it is experienced by the pilot), 
narrow limitations on parallel processing, arrow limitations on 
action speed, corporal needs (causing for instance fatigue) or 
negligence after training. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Work related to airliner safety may be classified in 
approaches, which treat single aspects and systems, integrating 
a family of characteristics. 
Single aspect approaches, by their very nature are merely an 
auxiliary means of detecting dangers. Though useful as a 
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 “standalone” object, in conjunction with a series of others they 
cause stress and an overload situation to the pilot (colloquially 
called a “horn concert” as by Stünkel [19]), which in most 
cases may result in sheer panic and loss of focus as shown by 
the Cali accident described above. As Stünkel also mentions, 
pilots are constantly trained to support multiple stimuli, but 
the conclusion that all this has a very narrow limit, is fairly 
trivial. Or, as aptly stressed by Hamilton [5]: “Our brains are 
set up to do two things, but not three (…)”. Thus, such 
systems are almost completely useless when an emergency 
with several focal points and necessity of in-depth analysis 
occurs and a solution seems a case of rather being lucky than 
interpreting things correctly. This is especially true in the 
dynamic environment of a modern jet airplane, where seconds 
of distraction can mean hundreds of deaths (due to jet speed 
and the need of the pilots to plan ahead). 
 
Some examples of single aspect approaches (see also [2]): 
 
• Landing gear warning systems, which advise the pilot 
that the landing gear has to be extended or retracted, de-
pending on the altitude; 
• Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS), 
which sound warning signals before an imminent mid-air 
crash [14]. The development has been motivated by the crash 
of a TWA Super Constellation and a United DC-7 [16], just as 
many other improvements were only executed after huge 
accidents and massive negative press. 
• Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS), which 
alert the pilot of a possible collision with ground; 
• Inertial Navigation System (INS), which is a navigational 
aid that determines position, orientation and velocity through 
motion and rotation sensors [7]; 
• Stall warning systems, which sound a few seconds before 
the real stall happens; 
• Weather radars with their known problems. The detect 
precipitation, which is related, but which is not at all the 
exclusive factor of turbulence. Weather radars have only short 
range on aircrafts and are prone to suffering a lot of distortion 
from external factors [9]; 
• System failure alerts (standard to some extent in any 
airplane). 
 
As useful as all of these systems may be on its own de-spite 
their common failures and malfunctions, the main issue 
remains that the pilot himself is the main and over-charged 
distribution node. 
There is already a tendency of integrating systems, which, 
however, has not been fully achieved yet. This means that 
there is no specific approach for emergency situations, but 
rather grouped in families of characteristics. 
Firstly, it should be mentioned that progress in modern jets’ 
cockpits has transformed the round “clock-like” instruments of 
more ancient aircraft into a series of computer screens, where 
information is displayed in a better, but yet mostly parallel and 
“indigested” manner (see [10][11][19]): 
 
• Primary flight display (PFD), showing heading, height, 
velocity and glide path for landings; 
• Navigation display (ND), which keeps track of the 
aircraft’s navigation with several ground elements dis-played 
as well as the weather radar; 
• Control and display units (CDUs), which are little 
screens with keyboard for the interaction with the Flight 
Management Computer. 
 
Finally, there are some systems being developed by NASA 
[12][13] which shall integrate some information and make the 
interpretation faster and more intelligent. As mentioned, they 
are grouped by characteristics [18]: 
 
• Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck (IIFD): optimized 
access to controls and better establishment of awareness on 
aircraft condition. Possibility of detection of internal and 
external hazards; 
• Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC): objective is 
the maintenance of maneuverability in adverse conditions 
(structural damage, control surface failure, icing etc.), relying 
on multidisciplinary design tools.  
• Integrated Vehicle Health Management Project (IVHM) 
has its focus on the treatment of adverse conditions related to 
the hardware and software situation of the aircraft. One of the 
main outputs is the remaining useful life of equipment with 
the possibility of posterior datamining. 
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
As said, the system SINCO-Flightsim is a simulation. It 
uses three main elements: 
First simulation element: A simulated environment of 
width, height and depth of 300 spaces, which implement a 
series of real-life parameters such as: Terrain and weather 
(water, rocks, earth, sand, lawn, trees, ice, snow, hailstone, 
rain, cloud, fog, clear air, building, runway, animal/human 
being, airplane), intensity of the element to implement (if 
applicable, i.e., with weather and vegetation), humidity in 
percent, temperature in degrees Celsius, wind angles and 
speed in km/h, current pressure in kPa (kilopascal), light 
intensity in kLx (kilolux) and V.O.R. (very high frequency 
omnidirectional range) signal intensity and corresponding 
radio station.  
Second simulation element: A simulated airplane (oriented 
at the Cessna® 172 Seahawk®), which uses typical aircraft 
sensors as well as additionally implemented ones for the 
treatment of emergency situations. 
Implemented sensors are the following: 
• Airspeed Indicator providing the airplane’s speed over 
ground in knots; 
• Vertical Speed Indicator indicating climb or descend in 
feet; 
• Bank Indicator for the coordination of rudder and aileron; 
• Heading Indicator showing the heading of the air-plane in 
relation to the compass; 
• Tachometer to show motor rotations per minute; 
• Altimeter providing the altitude in feet; 
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 • Attitude Indicator showing the angle of attack and turn 
angles of the aircraft; 
• V.O.R. Indicator providing proximity to a V.O.R. signal; 
• Fuel Indicator showing fuel level; 
• Temperature Sensor analyzing outside air temperature; 
• Current Time as by the clock; 
• Positions of flaps, throttle, landing lights, rudder and trim 
wheel are also mapped. 
Additionally implemented sensors are: 
• Damage at wings, rudder, elevator, ailerons, landing gear, 
flaps, windows, doors, fuselage, motor, trim tabs; 
• Water below (pilot informs this value); 
• Weather information in front of the plane and at the 
sides; 
• Instrument Landing System sensor (“out”, “middle”, 
“in”); 
• Anti-collision sensor. 
The following actuators are provided: 
• Accelerator, which may accelerate or slow down the 
propeller; 
• Ailerons, moving surface on the wings used to fly curves 
(together with the rudder); 
• Rudder, vertical moving surface at the tail to fly curves 
(together with aileron);  
• Elevator, horizontal moving surfaces at the tail used to 
climb or descend; 
• Trim wheel to stabilize climb or descend; 
• Motor (on/off); 
• Landing lights used near airports for better visibility 
(on/off). 
Third simulation element: Simulated flight, which may be 
executed in a continuous manner (providing a sequence of 
steps) or positioning the airplane freely and defining overall 
conditions. 
 
System processing happens as follows: 
 
1. From raw sensor data the system uses production rules to 
interpret the input for the use with the Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN), which expects standard binary inputs. 
Continuous data is translated into binary classes given. Table 
1 below describes all symbolic interpreter binary output 
mapped to the binary input layer of the network. 
2. Recognition (or not) of the emergency situation is 
determined by the ANN. 
3. After recognition the system generates an alert to the 
pilot, who may himself take action, let the system decide or 
preauthorize the system to act (which is configurable). 
4. If the system is set to act, the recommended action will 
be executed (using a symbolic routine) until its break 
condition is given or until the pilot interrupts it. 
Recommended actions vary from elimination of the problem, 
restrictions to ensure maneuverability to emergency settings 
(depending on the problem detected).  
The training set used in the SINCO-Flightsim comprises 48 
accident or incident setups, including: open door, aileron on 
one side damaged, collision from below, bird strike, collision 
with traffic on runway, air collision, freezing of aileron, 
freezing of rudder, freezing of elevator, motor damage 
because of excessive rotations, take-off with excessive weight, 
takeoff in thin air, late takeoff, malfunction of trim tabs, low 
descent to airport, steep descent to airport, flight through 
thunderstorms, navigational instruments malfunction, 
structural damage by hailstone, excessive altitude, missing 
upper fuselage, lack of fuel, flap on one side damaged, flap on 
both sides damaged, flaps extended during cruise, motor on 
fire, rudder damaged, dangerous maneuvers during 
turbulences, involuntary maneuvers in altitude, incorrect air 
speed measures, flaps fully extended during takeoff, stall 
because of steep bank angle, stall because of steep angle of 
attack, stall because of low speed, landing with wake 
turbulence, landing on water, landing in bad weather, landing 
out, elevator on one side damaged, elevator on both sides 
damaged, landing gear damaged, mountain shear, over 
controlling rudder, high landing speed and crosswinds on 
landing. The following list shows outputs of the symbolic 
interpreters (which mostly map continuous data to classes). 
Each interpreter provides a Boolean value. Thus, the results 
may be then passed on to the ANN’s inputs (table I). Note that 
some sensors are read directly (marked with “*”). Yet, it 
should be noted that the system determines the phase of the 
flight (takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing, taxi etc.) and 
provides it in a binary manner to the network (three bits).  
 
TABLE I.   
SYMBOLIC INTERPRETERS 
 
 
Left wing damaged (*) Day time
Right wing damaged (*) Night time
Rudder damaged (*) No ILS signal (*)
Elevator damaged (*) ILS “out” (*)
Left aileron damaged (*) ILS “middle” (*)
Right aileron damaged (*) ILS “in” (*)
Landing gear damaged (*) Flaps retracted
Left flap damaged (*) Flaps extended
Right flap damaged (*) Flaps completely extended
Window(s) broken(*) Throttle used
Door damaged (*) Lights on
Fuselage damaged (*) Lights off
Motor damaged (*) Rudder straight
Trim tab damaged (*) Rudder left/right
Water below (*) Excessive rudder
Anti-collision alert Trim tab used
Normal air speed Trim tab straight
Excessive air speed Excessive trim
Slow air speed Elevator straight
Stall Elevator up/down
Normal vertical velocity Excessive elevator
Excessive vertical velocity Weather in front normal
Normal bank angle Weather in front turbulent
Excessive bank angle Weather to the left normal
Normal rotations Weather to the left turbulent
Lack of rotations Weather to the right normal
Excessive rotations Weather to the right turbulent
Altitude normal Currently light or no turbulence
Excessive altitude Currently extreme turbulence
Altitude very low Excessive distance travelled on runway
Excessive angle of attack Distance travelled on runway normal
Normal angle of attack Flight phase (Bit 1)
Fuel normal Flight phase (Bit 2)
Imminent lack of fuel Flight phase (Bit 3)
Lack of fuel Normal aileron
Temperature above 0 degrees Celsius Excessive aileron
Temperature below 0 degrees Celsius
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 Every emergency case (including comb
cases) is codified by its characteristics in th
For every characteristic a relation is give
chance by which in a real setting the outp
production rule would be positive. Values ma
(for values, which will always be present), 
related, weakly related and no relation. D
definition, training cases are presented to the
of the imperative characteristics are marke
training sets’ inputs, 75% of the strongly relat
the related cases and 10% of the weakl
Training sets are generated by random and ev
trained over and over again – generating a d
time according to the rules above.  
There are 48 binary outputs, one for every p
if a case is identified, processing is handed o
(rule based) treatment procedure, which sh
case applying a series of measures until 
completion. 
Depending on the number of problems, 
conditions, levels of attention can be co
yellow, orange, red) and it may be decided 
should act and when it should merely alert the
V. CONNECTIONIST CORE 
SINCO-Flighsim uses a neural network top
from the real world environment is noisy a
tolerant treatment. This is the main justific
along with good performance values need
emergency situation. Quality guarantee o
provided through extensive tests, which wer
beginning of the development and shall
throughout all subsequent phases (see future 
below). 
The neural network topology employ
Flightsim is that of a bidirectional network (s
the sigmoid activation function and presen
with inputs (x1..xA), hidden layer (h1..hB) a
(o1..oC). Synaptic weights are between inputs 
(w11..wAB) and between hidden layer and outp
Supervised learning is used and the desired
provided during the learning phase, where co
several cases of disaster situations is being tra
The Generalized Recirculation algorithm (
a supervised learning algorithm based on bac
has its origins, as the name says, in a gene
recirculation algorithm created by Hinton and
Its purpose is to offer a means considered b
plausible of learning in ANNs by the pro
signals (“plus” and “minus”) through the
calculations of errors and the respective adjus
This way, it differs from the back-propa
which propagates the error “back” from the 
to the inputs). 
A successful implementation of Gen
architecture with bidirectional connection as 
present approach (see Fig. 1). More specifica
ined emergency 
e following way: 
n, meaning the 
ut of the related 
y be: Imperative 
strongly related, 
epending on the 
 network: 100% 
d as “1” in the 
ed cases, 40% of 
y related cases. 
ery case may be 
ifferent set every 
roblem case and 
ver to a specific 
ould handle the 
its condition of 
alerts and other 
nfigured (green, 
when the system 
 pilot. 
ology as the data 
nd needs a fault 
ation of its use 
ed in a real-life 
f the system is 
e executed at the 
 be maintained 
steps in section 7 
ed in SINCO-
ee Fig. 1), using 
ting three layers 
nd output layer 
and hidden layer 
uts (q11..qBC). 
 output (y1..yC) is 
rrect behavior in 
ined. 
GeneRec) [14] is 
k-propagation. It 
ralization of the 
 McClelland [6]. 
iologically more 
pagation of two 
 network, local 
tments [17]. 
gation algorithm 
outputs (directed 
eRec needs an 
is the case in the 
lly, signals from 
the output layer shall be propagated
The necessity of this backward pro
creation of memory, which is impe
sequences. Thus, the network’s 
merely on the current situation, but 
until then. 
Fig. 1. SINCO-Flightsim artificial neural netw
 
Still, network activations shall be
sigmoid function. 
For the following calculation st
that the network has A inputs, B
outputs. xi are the binary values at 
(i={1..A}). hj denote the activati
(j={1..B}), ok symbolizes the calcu
the desired output values (k={1..
between the inputs (xi) and the hid
are the weights of the synapses betw
the outputs (ok). N denotes the lear
the back-propagation algorithm, va
and 0) and σ refers to the activat
(σ ൌ ଵሺଵାୣష౮ሻ). 
The GeneRec algorithm follows th
 
Step 1: In the beginning real netw
 
o୩ ՚ 0  
 
Step 2: Inputs are attributed to
desired outputs are attributed to the 
 
x୧ ՚ ሼ0,1ሽ, y୩ ՚
 
Step 3: Inputs are attributed to
desired outputs are attributed to the 
 
 back to the hidden layer. 
pagation is given for the 
rative for the treatment of 
answer does not depend 
also on the steps executed 
 
ork layout 
 calculated by the standard 
eps it should be assumed 
 hidden neurons and C 
the network’s input layer 
ons at the hidden layer 
lated output values and yk 
C}). wij are the weights 
den layer (hj) whereas qjk 
een the hidden layer and 
ning rate (in analogy with 
lues should be between 1 
ion function via sigmoid 
ese processing steps: 
ork outputs o୩ are set to 0. 
                                      (1) 
 the input layer  x୧ and 
desired output layer  y୩. 
ሼ0,1ሽ                           (2) 
 the input layer  x୧ and 
desired output layer  y୩. 
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 h୨ା ൌ σሺ∑  w୧୨. x୧ ൅ ∑ q୨୩. y୩ሻ C୩ୀଵA୧ୀଵ                 (3) 
 
Step 4: Phase “minus” or “-“: activations of the hidden layer 
at neurons  h୨ି  are calculated defining the network’s 
“expectation” considering inputsx୧, previous outputs o୩ሺt െ 1ሻ 
as well as synapses (w୧୨ and q୨୩). 
 
h୨ି ൌ σሺ∑  w୧୨. x୧ ൅ ∑  q୨୩. o୩ሺt െ 1ሻሻC୩ୀଵA୧ୀଵ         (4) 
 
Step 5: Phase “minus” or “-“: Next activations o୩ሺtሻ are 
calculated from the activations at the hidden layer h୨ି   and 
synapses q୨୩. 
 
o୩ሺ୲ሻ ൌ σሺ∑ q୨୩. h୨ି ሻ B୨ୀଵ                       (5) 
 
Step 6: Adjustments at synapses are calculated (∆q୨୩ and 
Δw୧୨) considering activations of phase “plus” h୨ା, phase 
“minus” h୨ି , desired outputs (y୩), real outputs o୩ሺtሻ and 
learning rate η. 
 
∆q୨୩ ൌ η. ൫y୩ െ o୩ሺtሻ൯. h୨ି , Δw୧୨ ൌ η. ൫h୨ା െ h୨ି ൯. x୧   (6) 
VI. RESULTS 
Firstly, in the following part the learning of the training set 
was analyzed. During learning the training set is presented 
considering imperative characteristics to always map to “1” on 
the inputs and all other related to map to “1” or “0” depending 
on the probability of relation, thus generating different inputs 
with the same case and same training set. This also happens 
during later recognition of the real-life situation and is done to 
pre-model the noisy data, which is normally received in a real 
world setting. 
As first analysis, the mean square error at the outputs was 
calculated after 1000 training iterations leading to the diagram 
in Fig. 2 with low errors being displayed and showing an 
opposite behavior of back-propagation and GeneRec (both 
performing well at different rates with a slight advantage of 
GeneRec). Backpropagation performs better at higher learning 
rates, GeneRec at lower learning rates. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Learning success and learning rate 
 
In the following figures (figures 4-6) 30 neurons were used 
in the hidden layer. The best learning rates for each algorithm 
was chosen from figure 2, i.e. 0,1 for GeneRec and 0,9 for 
Backpropagation. As a second topic to look at, we are varying 
the configuration of the hidden layer. Values become 
relatively stable after the use of 18 neurons. GeneRec showed 
slightly better learning characteristics than back-propagation 
(Fig. 3). 
 
  
Fig. 3. Learning success and number of neurons in the hidden layer 
 
In order to determine which number of training iterations 
would be best, training was continued up to 9500 iterations 
testing at every 250 iterations the network’s training success. 
Firstly, it should be said that GeneRec has a much lower level 
of errors already at 500 iterations. Secondly, tendencies are 
relatively stable after 2500 iterations, whereas GeneRec still 
performs a little better showing an absolute minimum 8750 
iterations (Fig. 4). In this example the practical side is 
analyzed, i.e., not the mean square error, but the incorrect 
outcome (meaning that any value below 0,5 is considered as 0 
and any value 0,5 or above is considered as 1,0). 
 
  
Fig. 4. Evaluation of wrong choices and learning iterations 
 
Finally noise was introduced, meaning randomly inverting 
elements in the input layer (up to 15). Growth of error is 
relatively low and back-propagation shows very slightly more 
robust than GeneRec (Fig. 5). 
During 200 test flights with potentially unknown situations 
(i.e., unmapped directly in the training set) “false positive” 
and correct recognition of problem cases were evaluated. 
“False positive” did not happen in a single case (of 100), 
which is important because of the fact that the system must by 
all means remain silent during normal operation in order not to 
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 cause damage and injuries instead of avoiding them. On the 
other hand, problem cases received plausible treatment 
indications. 
 
  
Fig. 5. Evaluation of robustness. 
 
Considering the 100 problem flights, in all of the flights the 
problem condition was recognized and plausibly pointed at 
according to training. It should be noted that the network maps 
the problem condition itself (green, yellow, orange, red) and 
the diagnostic of the problem cause separately. Thus, even 
though some cases provided values below 0,5 for the chosen 
diagnostic, yet, it was always correctly mapped by the fact that 
it was the highest valued one of the given outputs.  
VII. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Logical next steps for the development of the present 
approach are firstly extension of the training set and its 
validation by aviation experts, next implementation on a 
physical model, implementation of additional aircraft 
characteristics modelling more complex settings and 
validation by additional physical models, test phase as parallel 
system on airplanes and finally productive rollout on airliners.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented SINCO-Flightsim, a simulator of 
emergency settings during flight, their detection by a 
connectionist core involving learning through GeneRec and 
treatment by symbolic routines. Detection through an 
Artificial Neural Network was implemented because of fault 
tolerance characteristics, which show advantages over 
classical approaches.  
The architecture of the system and its processing steps were 
discussed and learning as well as test flight results were 
commented. The use of GeneRec as learning method seems 
indicated as it provides better performance in most cases. 
The results obtained indicate that the approach success-fully 
detects and treats emergency setting in a simulation 
environment. This represents a proof of concept for the overall 
idea and opens the doors for further development. The authors 
trust that further development using physical models might in 
the end lead to a significant contribution to tomorrow’s 
aviation industry. 
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